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Constitutional pluralism and 
loyal opposition
Tom Flynn*,
Constitutional pluralism has long been controversial, but has recently come under renewed 
attack. Critics allege that by justifying departure by national courts from the Court of  Justice 
of  the European Union’s (CJEU) orthodoxy on the primacy of  EU law, constitutional plu-
ralism is (at best) susceptible to abuse by autocratic member state governments, or is (at 
worst) a favored tool of  Europe’s new authoritarians. This article is a defense of  heterodoxy 
in European constitutional thought, and of  constitutional pluralism in particular. It uses 
the concept of  “loyal opposition” as a framing discourse, allowing us to see that heterodox 
approaches to EU constitutionalism and opposition to the received and dominant interpreta-
tion of  the primacy of  EU law are not necessarily any less “loyal” to the principles and values 
of  European integration than agreement with the CJEU. A “legitimacy test” is proposed, by 
which we can determine whether a given instance of  national judicial disagreement with the 
CJEU is loyal, principled opposition, or disloyal, abusive opposition.
1. Introduction
Constitutional pluralism (CP) is the umbrella term for a range of  theories which all 
share a core descriptive and normative thesis: that the legal systems of  the European 
Union and of  its member states are best regarded as being arranged in a concep-
tual heterarchy, where no one system is normatively superior to the other, rather 
than in a hierarchy, where one system—European or national, depending on one’s 
preferences—must be supreme.
This has always been controversial, but recent developments have sharpened the 
tone of  the debate. Whereas critics of  CP have long sought to rebut either or both 
of  the idea’s twin claims to descriptive accuracy and normative desirability, and have 
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gone so far as to describe it as a threat to the rule of  law,1 the ongoing slide of  Hungary2 
and Poland3 into what GM Tamás described long ago as “post-fascism,”4 along with 
the potential for Italy, France, and many others to follow suit, has lent new urgency 
to the critique. Now, CP is castigated as a beloved tool of  autocrats,5 and critics argue 
that the actions of  Fidesz in Hungary and Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland, and of  the 
puppet courts that they have captured or created in their countries, prove the long-
held suspicions of  the sceptics that CP is an intolerable deviation from the Court of  
Justice of  the European Union’s (CJEU) account of  the primacy of  EU law.6 As Daniel 
Kelemen puts it,
[CP] should be abandoned by all those who value the survival of  the EU legal order and of  the 
European Union itself. Scholars should embrace the CJEU’s straightforward and compelling 
approach to the question of  supremacy: For those states that voluntarily choose to join and 
voluntarily choose to remain members of  the Union, EU law, and the Court of  Justice as the 
ultimate guardian of  that law, must enjoy unconditional supremacy.7
This analysis presents us with a clear and attractive binary: the absolute “supremacy”8 
of  EU law or barbarism.
In this article I argue that there are strong reasons why those of  us who, as Kelemen 
puts it, “value the survival of  the EU legal order and of  the European Union itself ” 
should not abandon CP, and should instead defend the idea from the charge that it is 
a dangerous enabler of  autocracy within EU member states. I do so by proposing that 
the notion of  loyal opposition might usefully be transposed from the domain of  politics 
to that of  law and legal scholarship, and adopted as an analytical framework through 
which we can conceptualize different kinds of  “opposition” to the absolutist concep-
tion of  the primacy of  EU law.
1 See Julio Baquero Cruz, Another Look at Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union, 22 Eur. L.J. 356 
(2016); Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Pluralism and Integrity, 23 ratio Juris 365 (2010); R.  Daniel Kelemen, 
On the Unsustainability of  Constitutional Pluralism: European Supremacy and the Survival of  the Eurozone, 
23 Maastricht J.  Eur. & coMp. L. 136 (2016); Joseph H.  H. Weiler, Prologue: Global and Pluralist 
Constitutionalism—Some Doubts, in thE WorLds of EuropEan constitutionaLisM 8 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joseph 
H. H. Weiler eds., 2012).
2 See generally andrás L. pap, dEMocratic dEcLinE in hungary: LaW and sociEty in an iLLibEraL dEMocracy (2018); 
András Bozóki & Dániel Hegedűs, An Externally Constrained Hybrid Regime: Hungary in the European Union, 
25 dEMocratization 1173 (2018).
3 See generally WoJciEch sadurski, poLand’s constitutionaL brEakdoWn (2019).
4 Gáspár Miklós Tamás, On Post-Fascism, boston rEv. (June 1, 2000), https://bostonreview.net/
world/g-m-tamas-post-fascism.
5 See R. Daniel Kelemen & Laurent Pech, The Uses and Abuses of  Constitutional Pluralism: Undermining the 
Rule of  Law in the Name of  Constitutional Identity in Hungary and Poland, 21 caMbridgE y.b. Eur. LEgaL stud. 
59, esp. 69–73 (2019) (referring to the Polish government’s invocation of  constitutional pluralism, and 
specifically the work of  Neil MacCormick, in order to justify its “reforms” of  the Polish judiciary).
6 See generally Federico Fabbrini & András Sajó, The Dangers of  Constitutional Identity, 25 Eur. L.J. 457 
(2019); R.  Daniel Kelemen, The Dangers of  Constitutional Pluralism, in rEsEarch handbook on LEgaL 
pLuraLisM and Eu LaW 392 (Gareth Davies & Matej Avbelj eds., 2018); Kelemen & Pech, supra note 5.
7 Kelemen, supra note 6, at 403.
8 On which term more below.
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1.1. Loyal opposition in the EU
The concept of  loyal opposition—in some form—is a key requirement of  a functioning 
democracy: it must be possible to oppose the policies and tendencies of  the current 
government without being branded a traitor, a subversive, or some other class of  un-
desirable. The particular phrase “loyal opposition” is associated most closely with the 
political system of  the United Kingdom.9 However, the same idea exists—with varying 
degrees of  embeddedness and formal institutionalization, and regardless of  its name—
in all the member states of  the EU.10
However, though the Treaty on European Union (TEU) is explicit that “[t]he 
functioning of  the Union shall be founded on representative democracy,”11 the idea 
of  loyal opposition has never developed at EU level.12 This is partially because it is 
difficult for a coherent opposition to develop in a political, legal, and constitutional 
system without a clearly delineated “government.” There is no “shadow Commission” 
waiting in the wings, willing and able to take office should it be given an electoral 
mandate, nor has there ever been a Commission of  coherent partisan hue. The 
Council and the European Council operate on the basis of  diplomacy, intergovern-
mental comity, and consensus-seeking:13 there is no “governing” coalition of  member 
states in the Councils, but rather alliances and majorities that are made on a con-
tingent, shifting, ad-hoc, and issue-by-issue basis. The Parliament has always been 
dominated by a grand coalition of  center-right and center-left, whereby opposition is 
left mainly to those who oppose European integration tout court; and we are left with 
two ideologically incoherent forces ranged against each other: the “pro-Europeans” 
and the “Eurosceptics.” In this reductive partisan binary, a broad coalition of  social 
democrats, liberals, and conservatives are arrayed against a similarly unwieldy coali-
tion of  those further right and further left.
This political binary, of  support for or resistance to European integration as a matter 
of  political identity—without much reference to the specific political or institutional 
context of  any given issue—is a significant barrier to any kind of  coherent democra-
tization of  the European Union: in a democracy, opposition and contestation are not 
pathologies to be discouraged and smothered, but rather signals of  a system in rude 
health.14 I argue that this unhelpful overlap of  opposition and Euroscepticism helps to 
9 JErEMy WaLdron, poLiticaL poLiticaL thEory 100 (2016).
10 Or at least, it is supposed to: the attitudes of  numerous governing parties across the Union to opposition, 
and not just Fidesz and PiS, frequently reveal an intolerant attitude that seeks to delegitimize opponents.
11 Consolidated Version of  the Treaty on European Union, art. 10(1), 2006 O.J. (C 321) E/5 [hereinafter TEU].
12 See pEtEr Mair, ruLing thE void: thE hoLLoWing-out of WEstErn dEMocracy 138 (2013), citing robErt a dahL, 
poLiticaL oppositions in WEstErn dEMocraciEs, at xiii (1966). See also Christopher Bickerton, Beyond the 
European Void? Reflections on Peter Mair’s Legacy, 24 Eur. L.J. 268 (2018).
13 See generally Jeffrey Lewis, EU Council Networks and the “Tradition” of  Consensus, in dEcEntEring EuropEan 
govErnancE 142 (Mark Bevir & Ryan Phillips eds., 2019).
14 This agonistic conception of  democracy differs significantly from a consensual model: compare Giuseppe 
Martinico, The “Polemical Spirit” of  European Constitutional Law: On the Importance of  Conflicts in EU Law, 
16 gErMan L.J. 1343 (2015) (relying on, inter alia, chantaL MouffE, on thE poLiticaL (2005)) and Sergio 
Fabbrini, Which Democracy for a Union of  States? A Comparative Perspective of  the European Union, 8 gLobaL 
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explain the critics’ wholesale rejection of  CP, and that an embrace of  the concept of  
loyal opposition would have important and beneficial knock-on effects on EU law and 
legal scholarship, as we shall now see.
1.2. The structure of  the argument
Just as the lack of  a loyal opposition in the European political sphere leads to the 
catastrophization of  disagreement into existential questions of  “pro-Europeanism” 
or “Euroscepticism,” intolerance of  reasonable national court objection to the ap-
plication of  the primacy principle in particular cases catastrophizes legitimate legal 
dissent into constitutional crisis. In Section 2, I  interrogate this case law, and pro-
pose a framework, drawn in part from the jurisprudence of  the CJEU, whereby we 
can learn to distinguish legitimate, “loyal” opposition in European constitutional re-
lations from abusive,15 “disloyal” opportunism. In doing so, I analyze five particular 
cases of  national rejection of  CJEU jurisprudence: two cases of  loyal opposition; two 
cases of  disloyal opposition; and one that is less straightforward. Close analysis of  
this case law reveals the high degree of  asymmetry between different instances of  ju-
dicial opposition in EU law, and thus the poverty of  any discourse that explicitly or 
implicitly bunches these disparate histories together as instances of  some ill-defined 
“neo-sovereigntism,”16 or uses the latter cases as a reason to abandon the entire dis-
course of CP.
In Section 3, I will argue that far from being a threat to the integrity of  EU law or 
to the existence of  the Union, legal and constitutional conflict between the European 
Union and its member states can be a good, useful, and justifiable thing in particular 
political and legal contexts, serving as a kind of  animating tension, analogous to the 
distribution of  normative power across different institutions—executive, legislative, 
and judicial—at state level. Moreover, preserving the legitimate possibility of  such 
an animating tension may yet become painfully necessary, if  the widespread belief  in 
the European Union as a bulwark against authoritarianism proves to be mistaken, as 
I fear it yet might. In the actually existing context of  imperfect member states in an 
imperfect Union, scholars—like judges, politicians, and citizens—should be hesitant 
to accept the claims of  one constitutional order over another uncritically, and equally 
hesitant to accept the equation of  heterodox thinking with disloyalty to the claimed 
values of  the European project.
2. From opposition to EU law to opposition in EU law
The reduction of  European politics to the “pros” and the “antis” is mirrored in EU law, 
whereby any deviation from CJEU orthodoxy by national actors gets dramatized and 
cast as a fundamental threat to the unity and integrity of  the EU legal order. It is of  
course true that a politician or citizen arguing against Union policy is not the same 
15 David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 u.c. davis L. rEv. 189 (2013).
16 Fabbrini & Sajó, supra note 6, at 458.
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thing as a court refusing to follow the CJEU’s interpretation of  the requirements of  EU 
law. But the kinds of  instances of  legal opposition that the CJEU has faced need not be 
catastrophized in this way. As we shall see, they are sometimes rather ordinary legal 
disputes that the overconstitutionalized17 nature of  EU law transforms into constitu-
tional crises. The CJEU’s orthodoxy generally gives hierarchical superiority in cases 
of  conflict to all EU law, including EU secondary law, over all national law, including 
national constitutional law.18 The result is that not only are the EU Treaties themselves 
given constitutional status in their entirety, but in the member states, any piece of  EU 
law, from the most fundamental to the most pettifogging, must be treated as if  it were 
the bedrock of  the legal system, and as normatively superior to the deepest statement 
of  the national polity’s self-image. Certainly the CJEU’s longstanding arguments for its 
conception of  primacy are good ones: legal certainty, uniformity across the European 
Union, and the principle of  sincere cooperation19 are important, and member states 
cannot be allowed simply to ignore any aspect of  EU law they happen to dislike. But 
however strong, these arguments are not insuperable in every set of  circumstances, 
and it is for precisely this reason that in hard cases many national courts have been 
rather more heterodox in their interpretation and application of  the primacy principle.
In this section, I  will examine five examples of  oppositional practice by national 
courts, emphasizing their diversity as regards origins, impact, and resolution, but also 
as regards their political orientation: what were these national courts seeking to achieve 
by their actions; what vision of  the constitution and of  the polity does this reveal; and 
were the national courts engaging in legitimate loyal opposition, or abusive opportun-
istic illegality? In this respect, the analysis looks not merely at legal text but at political 
subtext. In order to answer these questions, we must first set out some preliminary 
criteria against which we can measure the courts’ behavior.
2.1. The legitimacy test
Usefully, the CJEU has already done some of  the work for us. In the case of  LM,20 the 
CJEU held that a national court may be entitled to refuse to execute a European Arrest 
Warrant if, “on the basis of  material that is objective, reliable, specific, and properly 
updated concerning the operation of  the system of  justice in the issuing Member 
State,”21 there is a “real risk,” connected with a lack of  judicial independence, of  the 
right to a fair trial being breached.
Drawing on this, I propose that if  there is good evidence that an apex court in a given 
member state should not be regarded as a properly independent judicial body, this is 
17 Dieter Grimm, The Democratic Costs of  Constitutionalisation: The European Case, 21 Eur. L.J. 460, 
470 (2014).
18 Case 6/64, Costa v.  ENEL, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66; Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 
ECLI:EU:C:1970:114. Though note the CJEU’s own exceptions to the principle, as in Case C-36/02, 
Omega, ECLI:EU:C:2004:614; Case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein, ECLI:EU:C:2010:806; Case C-391/09, 
Runevič-Vardyn, ECLI:EU:C:2011:291.
19 TEU, supra note 11, art. 4(3).
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strongly persuasive evidence that its invocation of  constitutional identity, or any other 
“interface norm”22—such as fundamental rights or the principle of  conferral—to jus-
tify departure from EU law should be regarded as illegitimate and abusive—an instance 
of  “disloyal opposition.” Such evidence could be drawn, for example, from the work of  
the Venice Commission, the Helsinki Committees, or other respected bodies with ex-
pertise on judicial independence, the rule of  law, democracy, and human rights, along 
with the work of  scholars. Similarly, but in reverse, a verifiably independent judicial 
body governed by—and in turn applying—the rule of  law is entitled at the very least 
to be given a fair hearing when it holds that certain factors, whether these be issues of  
fundamental rights; constitutional identity; the question of  Kompetenz–Kompetenz; or 
any other interface norm, require it to disapply or modify any norm of  EU law insofar 
as the national constitutional order is concerned.
But this is only the first—institutional—element of  the test. The second element—
which is substantive or analytical—concerns the quality of  the reasoning employed. 
By this I do not only mean justifiability and cogency, but what Miguel Poiares Maduro 
long ago called “horizontal and vertical coherence.”23 Relevant factors here include, 
but are not limited to, whether the national decision is grounded in persuasive en-
gagement with common European and international standards; serious engagement 
with EU law and with the jurisprudence of  the CJEU; good-faith attempts to enter into 
formal dialogue with that court through the procedure under Article 267 of  the Treaty 
on the Functioning of  the European Union (TFEU);24 and whether or not the decision 
evinces an image of  the national polity as one member state among many—co-equal 
to all the others, and deserving of  neither less nor more concern and respect than any 
other—consistent with the equality of  the member states under the EU Treaties.25
This two-legged “legitimacy test” is by no means exhaustive, but it allows us at least 
to begin developing a more sophisticated approach to judicial pushback against the 
unqualified “supremacy” of  EU law than outright rejection of  all such action on the 
mere grounds that this is how the pet courts of  autocratic governments behave. Much 
like a stopped clock being right twice a day, even the most obviously captured kan-
garoo court might sometimes hand down a justifiable and cogent judgment, and thus 
fail the first element of  the test, but pass the second; and even a court of  the most im-
peccable constitutionalist and democratic credentials might deliver a judgment that 
is poorly reasoned or solipsistic, and thus pass the first element of  the test, but fail the 
second. With this legitimacy test in mind, let us turn to the case law.
22 See nico krisch, bEyond constitutionaLisM: thE pLuraList structurE of postnationaL LaW 285–6 (2010); toM 
fLynn, thE trianguLar constitution: constitutionaL pLuraLisM in irELand, thE Eu, and thE Echr, at xxvii–xxix, 
28–30 (2019).
23 See Miguel Poiares Maduro, Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action, in sovErEignty 
in transition 501, 527–30 (Neil Walker ed., 2003).
24 Consolidated Version of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union, June 7, 2016, O.J. (C 
202) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
25 See Federico Fabbrini, After the OMT Case: The Supremacy of  EU Law as the Guarantee of  the Equality of  the 
Member States, 16 gErMan L.J. 1003 (2015). But see Ana Bobić, Constitutional Pluralism Is Not Dead: An 
Analysis of  Interactions Between Constitutional Courts of  Member States and the European Court of  Justice, 18 
gErMan L.J. 1395, 1407–09 (2017).
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2.2. Legitimate, loyal opposition
a) The Taricco saga
The Corte Costituzionale (Italian Constitutional Court, ICC) has long maintained that 
it has the right to prioritize the Italian Constitution over EU law where it believes EU 
law to be in breach of  fundamental constitutional principles.26 However, this claimed 
right to depart from EU law, including CJEU judgments, is tempered by a generally ac-
commodating attitude.27
The Taricco dialogue28 of  the CJEU and the ICC demonstrates exactly the kind of  
legitimate, “loyal” oppositional practice that should be regarded as an inherent and 
desirable component of  the interplay between Union law and national law, and not 
as some pathological outlier, or as succor for authoritarians. The first element of  our 
legitimacy test can be dealt with briefly: the ICC is an independent body, against which 
no serious allegation of  executive capture can be maintained. The second element 
requires close examination of  the ICC’s reasoning.
The saga began with a preliminary reference to the CJEU from an Italian court 
dealing with a criminal case of  value-added tax (VAT) fraud.29 The referring court 
asked whether the national period of  limitation for proceedings such as these was so 
short as to amount to de facto impunity, contrary to EU law.30 The CJEU held that if, 
“in a considerable number of  case[s],” the time limit would result in “the commission 
of  serious fraud [escaping] criminal punishment,”31 the EU Treaties would require the 
disapplication of  the relevant national statute of  limitations.32
However, the application of  the CJEU’s Taricco rule gave rise to constitutional 
difficulties in subsequent cases. For the ICC, the Taricco conditions were insufficiently 
precise to satisfy the Italian conception of  the constitutional principle of  legality, and, 
in any event, required the judiciary to involve itself  in matters of  criminal policy, con-
trary to Article 101(2) of  the Constitution’s requirement that “[j]udges are subject 
only to law.” Accordingly,
[I]t is necessary to ask whether the [CJEU] took the view that the national courts should apply 
the rule even where it conflicts with a supreme principle of  the Italian legal system. This Court 
thinks that it did not, but considers that it is in any case appropriate to bring the doubt to the 
attention of  the [CJEU].33
26 See Corte cost., 18 dicembre 1973, n.  183, ECLI:IT:COST:1973:183 [hereinafter Frontini] (It.); Corte 
cost., 5 giugno 1984, n. 170, ECLI:IT:COST:1984:170 [hereinafter Granital] (It.); Corte cost., 13 aprile 
1989, n. 232, ECLI:IT:COST:1989:232 [hereinafter FRAGD] (It.).
27 See Giovanni Piccirilli, The “Taricco Saga”: The Italian Constitutional Court Continues Its European Journey, 
14 Eur. const. L. rEv. 814, 816–17 (2018).
28 See generally Matteo Bonelli, The Taricco Saga and the Consolidation of  Judicial Dialogue in the European 
Union, 25 Maastricht J. Eur. & coMp. L. 357 (2018).
29 Case C-105/14, Taricco, ECLI:EU:C:2015:555 [hereinafter Taricco I].
30 Specifically to TFEU, supra note 24, arts. 101, 107, 119, and to Council Directive 2006/112/EC of  28 
November 2006 on the common system of  value added tax, 2006 O.J. (L 347) 1.
31 Case C-105/14, Taricco I, ECLI:EU:C:2015:555, ¶ 47.
32 The common English-language term “statute of  limitations” is used here analogically, as the limitation 
period is not a separate statute but is prescribed in the Penal Code itself. See Codice penale [C.P.], arts. 
157–161 (It.).
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Here we see a loyal, reputable national court suggesting an answer to its question that 
would satisfy both the domestic and European legal orders. Elsewhere in the Order, the 
ICC makes clear its cooperative—but watchful—approach to EU law:
The recognition of  the primacy of  EU law is an established fact within the case law of  this Court 
pursuant to Article 11 of  the Constitution; moreover, according to such settled case law, com-
pliance with the supreme principles of  the Italian constitutional order and inalienable human 
rights is a prerequisite for the applicability of  EU law in Italy.34
In this way, the ICC politely suggested that the Luxembourg court may wish to “clarify” 
(that is, “correct”) the rule in Taricco I.
The CJEU obliged in Taricco II.35 In answering the ICC’s questions, the CJEU essen-
tially recited the reasoning in Taricco I36 before backtracking: now, rather than au-
tomatically requiring judicial action, “[i]t is primarily for the national legislature to 
lay down rules on limitation that enable compliance with the obligations under [the 
Taricco rule].”37 With just a few words, the CJEU entirely altered the thrust of  its pre-
vious judgment, and seemingly admitted that it had asked too much of  the Italian 
courts—and, by extension, all national courts. I  argue that the CJEU was aided in 
coming to this conclusion by the ICC’s prior statement that even if  it were to have held 
the Taricco rule unconstitutional, this would not “alter the liability of  the Republic of  
Italy for having failed to provide an effective remedy against serious tax fraud affecting 
the financial interests of  the Union.”38 The ICC, having recognized that something had 
to be done to bring Italian law into line with the CJEU’s requirements, was merely 
pointing out to the CJEU the intense constitutional difficulty in Italy of  the judiciary 
doing the heavy lifting. This surely made it less difficult for the CJEU to shift the burden 
from the judges to the legislators: the ICC’s acknowledgment of  potential Italian state 
liability cast the ICC not as a recalcitrant external actor, but as a loyal Union court 
opposing the CJEU’s interpretation of  the Treaties for justifiable reasons of  legal and 
constitutional integrity.
In resolving the specific problem in casu, the CJEU spoke in a harmonious mode 
of  how there is nothing specifically Italian about the principle of  legality in criminal 
matters, which forms part of  the well-worn “constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States.”39 It went on to note that the principle’s requirements of  foreseea-
bility, precision, and non-retroactivity would preclude Union law from requiring the 
disapplication of  the statute of  limitations in cases where the alleged offence occurred 
before the judgment in Taricco I was handed down. This being the case with the 
offences at issue in Taricco II, the CJEU seems to have hoped that the issue of  constitu-
tionality would no longer arise.
34 Id. at 3.
35 Case C-42/17, MAS, MB, ECLI:EU:C:2017:936 [hereinafter Taricco II].
36 Id. ¶¶ 29–40.
37 Id. ¶ 41 (emphasis added).
38 Corte cost., 23 novembre 2016, Ordinanza 24/2017, ECLI:IT:COST:2017:24, at 7.
39 Case C-42/17, Taricco II, ECLI:EU:C:2017:936, ¶ 53.
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The final instalment in the saga came in judgment 115/2018.40 One might be 
forgiven for imagining that the CJEU’s backtracking would be the end of  matters.41 
However, the ICC went much further in its response than simply acknowledging that 
the CJEU had held the Taricco rule inapplicable to events that predate it, and went on 
to hold that it could never be applied in Italy. Here, we must turn to the second el-
ement of  the legitimacy test. The court’s reasoning is principled and compelling: to 
hold that the alleged crimes were time-barred because they took place before Taricco 
was decided would still be “applying” the Taricco rule, no less than if  it were held that 
the crimes were not time-barred because they post-dated the rule’s creation.42 The 
overall thrust of  the ICC’s judgment is that the Taricco rule is so vague that even if  it 
were to “take on a less hazy outline” over time,43 this would not compensate for its 
initial underspecification. The rule, being incompatible with a fundamental constitu-
tional principle, therefore never entered the Italian legal system through the domestic 
provisions providing for the effectiveness of  EU law, which only import EU law to the 
extent that it is compatible with the constitution. It is for the Italian legislator, the ICC 
held, to ensure that Italy honors its obligations to the European Union by making the 
law compliant with the EU Treaties: such changes to the statute of  limitations must be 
legislative in nature, of  exclusively prospective effect, and clear enough to satisfy the 
principle of  legality.
Chiara Amalfitano and Oreste Pollicino argue that the ICC and CJEU are speaking 
different “languages” here;44 but it is entirely unsurprising that two differently 
situated courts in a legal heterarchy might seek to achieve similar (or at least com-
patible) results by different means. The point is one of  institutional orientation and 
epistemological viewpoint. It is in the nature of  the CJEU, as a supranational body, to 
seek to emphasize the commonalities of  the different legal systems the coordination 
of  which is part of  its jurisdiction and the infiltration of  which (I use the word literally 
and non-pejoratively) is part of  its mission. It is in the nature of  the ICC, as a national 
apex court, to seek to preserve the sphere of  its own jurisdiction and to preserve the 
integrity of  the national constitutional order. These are valid approaches. Moreover, 
they are not mutually exclusive. As the ICC made clear, the primacy of  EU law really is 
part of  the Italian constitutional order: it is just not its only or main principle. Similarly, 
respect for national constitutional identity—whether scholars like it or not, on which 
more below—really is part of  the Union legal order: it is just not its only or main prin-
ciple. It is not that the Italian court is trying to dodge EU law, it is that the court—a rep-
utable, independent judicial body—had specific, principled, and justifiable objections 
to the incompatibility with EU law being remedied in the manner proposed—or rather 
40 Corte cost., 10 aprile 2018, n. 115, ECLI:IT:COST:2018:115, translation at www.cortecostituzionale.it/
documenti/download/doc/recent_judgments/S_2018_115_EN.pdf.
41 Chiara Amalfitano & Oreste Pollicino, Two Courts, Two Languages? The Taricco Saga 
Ends on a Worrying Note, vErfassungsbLog (June 5, 2018), https://verfassungsblog.de/
two-courts-two-languages-the-taricco-saga-ends-on-a-worrying-note/.
42 Corte cost., 10 aprile 2017, n. 115, ECLI:IT:COST:2018:115, at 5.
43 Id. at 6.
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demanded—by the CJEU. The correct approach, for the ICC, is legislative. If  this leaves 
Italy in breach of  the Treaties pending such legislative change, then so be it: such is the 
price of  the preservation of  the integrity of  the constitutional order.
Such conflict or disagreement—such loyal opposition—is a justifiable and desirable 
part of  a composite legal order like that of  the Union and its Member States, and this is 
all the more so in the context of  an overconstitutionalized and insufficiently politicized 
order. The CJEU—and scholarship generally—does not currently recognize behavior 
such as the ICC’s in this context as loyal opposition. It should.
b) The Ajos case
A comparable case of  principled, justifiable, loyal opposition to the CJEU’s interpre-
tation of  the requirements of  EU law was in Denmark, where the Højesteret (Danish 
Supreme Court, DSC)—a body no less independent and reputable than the ICC—ex-
plicitly refused in Ajos45 to disapply a national legal provision which conflicted with the 
general principle of  EU law prohibiting age discrimination.
Danish law provided that long-serving salaried employees would receive a sever-
ance allowance on dismissal. There were exceptions to this rule, which in a previous 
case, Ole Andersen,46 the CJEU found to constitute direct discrimination on grounds 
of  age, contrary to the Employment Equality Framework Directive.47 Having been 
dismissed by a state body, Andersen could rely directly on the Directive, and the Danish 
court was required to disapply the discriminatory exceptions and order that the sever-
ance allowance be paid.
Ajos was a case was between private parties. A lower Danish court, relying on Ole 
Andersen, had ordered Ajos to pay the former employee the severance allowance, 
disapplying the exceptions not in favor of  the Directive itself, but in light of  the hori-
zontally directly effective general principle of  EU law prohibiting age discrimination, 
of  which the Directive is only a concrete expression.48 Ajos appealed to the DSC, which 
referred two questions to the CJEU.49 The first question was on the substantive issue 
of  whether the general principle precluded the discriminatory exceptions. The second 
question asked if, in determining whether to disapply the Danish law, the DSC would 
be entitled to weigh the general principle prohibiting age discrimination against the 
competing principles of  legal certainty and legitimate expectations, and whether it 
45 Højesteret afgørelse af  06.12.2016 [Decision of  the Supreme Court of  Dec. 6, 2016] No. 15/2014 (Dansk 
Industri acting for Ajos) (Den.), translation at https://domstol.dk/media/2udgvvvb/judgment-15–2014.
pdf. See generally Mikael Risk Madsen, Henrik Palmer Olsen, & Urška Šadl, Competing Supremacies and 
Clashing Institutional Rationalities: The Danish Supreme Court’s Decision in the Ajos Case and the National 
Limits of  Judicial Cooperation, 23 Eur. L.J. 140 (2017).
46 Case C-499/08, Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark (Ole Anderson) v.  Region Syddanmark, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:600.
47 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of  27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treat-
ment in employment and occupation, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16.
48 Sø- og Handelsretten afgørelse af  14.01.2014 [Decision of  the Maritime and Commercial Court of  Jan. 
14, 2014], No. F-19-12 (Den.).
49 Case C-441/14, Dansk Industri (Ajos) v. Rasmussen, ECLI:EU:C:2016:278.
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was relevant that the employee would be able to claim compensation from the state for 
the loss caused by the incompatibility of  Danish law with EU law.
The Supreme Court’s preferred solution to the problem in the case was clear 
from its second question. Ajos was not even tangentially responsible for Denmark’s 
failure properly to implement the Directive (unlike the public-sector employer in Ole 
Andersen), and had acted in good faith and in accordance with Danish law as it stood 
at the time. The principle of  legal certainty therefore required that it not be ordered to 
make a payment that it had a legitimate expectation that it would not have to make. 
The principle that national law must be interpreted consistently with EU law does 
not go so far as to allow for an interpretation contra legem.50 Consistent interpretation 
being impossible, and disapplication being contrary to the principles of  legal certainty 
and legitimate expectations, the case must be decided in Ajos’s favor. Of  course, none 
of  this would solve the problem that Denmark (and not Ajos) had breached EU law to 
the detriment of  the dismissed employee. The solution, therefore, was for the employee 
to claim Francovich damages from the state for its inaction.51 In this way, Ajos is not 
punished for an error that was not its fault; the employee is not denied, for discrimina-
tory reasons, money to which they were entitled; and the member state is punished for 
failing in its obligations under EU law. EU law is upheld; the rights of  both parties to the 
case are upheld; and all this in a manner consistent with both EU law and Danish law.
But the CJEU did not take the DSC up on its offer, instead holding fast to its Mangold52 
and Kücükdeveci53 case law on the horizontal direct effect of  the general principle 
prohibiting discrimination on grounds of  age. The Court dealt with the issue of  legit-
imate expectations tersely,54 and made no substantive observations on the principle 
of  legal certainty at all. The possibility of  Francovich damages being claimed against 
Denmark for its breach of  EU law was also not enough, in the Court’s eyes, to absolve 
the DSC of  its obligation either to interpret the national legislation compatibly with EU 
law, or, if  this is impossible, to disapply it, though this is a conclusion the court reached 
without reasoning.55 The instruction from Luxembourg was therefore as clear as it 
was peremptory and badly reasoned: whether by interpretation or disapplication, the 
DSC must order Ajos to pay the severance allowance.
The DSC declined to do so, by a majority of  8:1. Its reasoning was based closely on 
the specific manner in which Danish law incorporates and gives effect to EU law, and 
on the DSC’s conception of  the relationship between the two systems, which closely 
mirrors that of  the ICC in the Taricco cases:
The [CJEU] has jurisdiction to rule on questions concerning the interpretation of  EU law . . . . It 
is therefore for the [CJEU] to rule on whether a rule of  EU law has direct effect and takes prece-
dence over a conflicting national provision, including in disputes between individuals.
The question whether a rule of  EU law can be given direct effect in Danish law, as required 
50 See Case C-282/10, Dominguez, ECLI:EU:C:2012:33, ¶ 25.
51 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich, ECLI:EU:C:1991:428.
52 Case C-144/04, Mangold, ECLI:EU:C:2005:709.
53 Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci, ECLI:EU:C:2010:21.
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under EU law, turns first and foremost on the Law on accession by which Denmark acceded to 
the European Union.56
The Danish Accession Act allows the EU institutions to exercise the Danish state’s con-
stitutional powers in accordance with the EU Treaties.57 However, the DSC noted that the 
CJEU located the source of  the general principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds 
of  age specifically not in the Treaties, but in “various international instruments” and 
in the constitutional traditions common to the member states.58 For the DSC,
A situation such as this, in which a principle at treaty level under EU law is to have direct effect 
(thereby creating obligations) and be allowed to take precedence over conflicting Danish law in 
a dispute between individuals, without the principle having any basis in a specific treaty provi-
sion, is not foreseen in the Law on accession.59
The point is not whether the horizontally directly effective general principle prohibiting 
age discrimination is a good thing or a bad thing: rather, as with the Taricco case law, 
the issue is one of  institutional orientation and epistemological viewpoint. The DSC 
held that just as it is the right and obligation of  the CJEU to determine the content of  
EU law, it is the right and obligation of  the Folketing (Danish Parliament) to deter-
mine how EU law is made effective within Denmark. The question of  the interpreta-
tion of  the Danish Accession Act,60 and of  whether, to what extent, and in what way 
this particular general principle of  EU law flowed into Danish law, was therefore a 
threshold question exclusively within the jurisdiction of  the Danish court.61 In this 
particular case, the Court detected an irreconcilable tension between its duties as a 
national court and as an EU court, and felt itself  unable, as a Danish court, to act in 
such a way as to go beyond the extent to which the Folketing had imported EU law into 
the Danish legal system.
The Italian and Danish cases illustrate situations where reputable judicial 
institutions engaged in reasoned and principled—loyal—oppositional practice within 
the constitutional sphere. They did so for reasons with which it is perfectly possible to 
disagree: it is legitimate to argue that both the ICC and DSC were wrong, and should 
have followed the reasoning of  the CJEU, whatever its flaws. But the decisions of  the 
ICC and DSC do not only make sense within the internal perspectives of  Italian and 
Danish constitutional law: they are also justifiable from within the epistemology of  a 
European Union of  member states united in diversity. They pass both elements of  the 
legitimacy test, and must be distinguished from the cases to which we now turn.
56 Højesteret afgørelse af  06.12.2016 [Decision of  the Supreme Court of  Dec. 6, 2016] No. 15/2014 (Dansk 
Industri acting for Ajos) at 45 (Den.).
57 Id.
58 Case C-441/14, Dansk Industri (Ajos) v. Rasmussen, ECLI:EU:C:2016:278, ¶ 22.
59 Højesteret afgørelse af  06.12.2016 [Decision of  the Supreme Court of  Dec. 6, 2016] No. 15/2014 (Dansk 
Industri acting for Ajos) at 45 (Den.).
60 Loven om Danmarks tiltrædelse af  Den Europæiske Union (Tiltrædelsesloven), Lov Nr. 447 af  11.10.1972 
[Act on Denmark’s Accession to the European Union (Accession Act), Law no. 447 of  Oct. 11, 1972)] (as 
amended) (Den.).
61 Højesteret afgørelse af  06.12.2016 [Decision of  the Supreme Court of  Dec. 6, 2016] No. 15/2014 (Dansk 
Industri acting for Ajos) at 47.
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2.3. Illegitimate, disloyal opposition
In this section, we will see that not all opposition to EU law is justifiable or loyal. The 
first case to be examined is one of  merely misguided and poorly reasoned opposition 
by an independent, reputable court. It can rightly be criticized, but thankfully has had 
little negative impact. The second is far more disturbing, and shows a disreputable, 
captured institution engaging in oppositional practice for reasons contrary to the EU’s 
values, and ultimately incompatible with continued membership in good standing of  
the European Union.
a) The Holubec case
The decision of  the Ústavní soud (Czech Constitutional Court, CCC) in Holubec62 was 
the first time a national court declared a judgment of  the CJEU (in Landtová63) to be ultra 
vires.64 The dispute arose in the politically, jurisdictionally, and historically contingent 
context of  the breakup of  the Czecho-Slovak federation; of  a treaty between the two 
successor states regarding the pension rights of  citizens of  one state who had worked 
for an employer domiciled in the other; and against the background of  a long-running 
institutional turf  war between the CCC and the Czech Supreme Administrative Court 
(CSAC) on the matter, which developed throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and be-
came highly personalized between the members of  the two courts.
Czech pensions being generally more valuable than Slovak ones, the CCC held that 
the Czech state must top up the smaller Slovak pensions of  Czech (but not Slovak) cit-
izens living in Czechia. This requirement was contested by the CSAC, which referred 
the matter to Luxembourg: the question was whether the top-up discriminated on 
grounds of  nationality contrary to EU law. Quite rightly, in Landtová, the CJEU found 
that it did.
In declaring the Landtová judgment ultra vires, the CCC did not ground its analysis 
in any specific Czech or EU constitutional principle or right that the CJEU had failed 
to respect. Indeed, the CCC engaged in no analysis of  the CJEU’s reasoning at all: the 
mere fact that Landtová had contradicted the CCC on the issue (and had agreed with 
the CSAC) was enough for the CCC to declare that the CJEU had exceeded the scope of  
the powers transferred to the Union under the Czech constitution.65 The one actual 
deficiency that the CCC claimed to identify in Landtová was an alleged infringement of  
the right to a fair trial.66 Almost comically, the “victim” of  this infringement was the 
CCC itself, which was not a party to the proceedings in Landtová, and had attempted to 
62 Nález Ústavního soudu ze dne 31.01.2012 (ÚS) [Decision of  the Constitutional Court of  Jan. 31, 2012] 
Pl ÚS 5/12, translation at www.usoud.cz/fileadmin/user_upload/ustavni_soud_www/Decisions/pdf/
Pl%20US%205–12.pdf  [hereinafter Holubec].
63 Case C-399/09, Landtová, ECLI:EU:C:2011:415.
64 See Michal Bobek, Landtová, Holubec, and the Problem of  an Uncooperative Court: Implications for the 
Preliminary Rulings Procedure, 10 Eur. const. L. rEv. 54 (2014).
65 Nález Ústavního soudu ze dne 31.01.2012 (ÚS) [Decision of  the Constitutional Court of  Jan. 31, 2012] 
Pl ÚS 5/12, at 13.
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write a letter to the CJEU explaining and justifying its case law, which the CJEU rightly 
ignored.67
Zdeněk Kühn uses Holubec to argue that constitutional pluralism is “a flawed theory 
because it celebrates very dangerous outcomes for everyday cases.”68 But there is 
nothing for anyone, constitutional pluralist or otherwise, to celebrate about Holubec. 
The CCC’s declaration that the CJEU had acted ultra vires was both inapt and inept, 
yet we can recognize this without abandoning the fundamentally sound reasons 
why such a declaration should be possible from the domestic perspective: the issue of  
Kompetenz–Kompetenz; the fact that the European Union is not a vertically integrated, 
complete system of  legal and constitutional authority; and the institutional obligation 
of  national courts both to enforce Union law and uphold the national constitutional 
order simultaneously. The simple fact is that the CCC failed in both of  its obligations 
in Holubec: it failed to enforce EU law; and it did so for reasons that had nothing to do 
with upholding the national constitution, protecting fundamental rights, or policing 
the limited competences of  the Union. The CCC’s decision in Holubec is therefore not 
the sort of  loyal opposition that I have been conceptualizing in this section. This does 
not mean the case is without its uses: it serves as a helpful sort of  negative precedent, 
a foil that illustrates the importance of  loyalty in opposition, and in this case, loyalty 
not only to the Union or the national constitution, but to the reasoned justification 
that courts are supposed to provide. Holubec therefore passes the first element of  the 
legitimacy test, but fails the second.
b) Decision 22/2016
Similarly useful as a negative precedent, but far more serious, is Decision 22/201669 of  
the Alkotmánybíróság (Hungarian Constitutional Court, HCC). The HCC is a captured 
institution, operating in a context of  democratic and constitutional backsliding. As 
Halmai notes, the case was cherry-picked and confected from a previously abandoned 
application by the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, a similarly captured consti-
tutional officer, in the aftermath of  the Fidesz government’s anti-migrant referendum 
of  October 2016. The government having failed to secure a valid result in the refer-
endum due to low turnout, its judicial servants in the HCC were only too happy to offer 
their masters a way forward.70
The Commissioner asked two questions of  the HCC. The first related to a Council 
Decision providing for the relocation of  refugees.71 In a display of  rank intellectual 
perversion, the Commissioner asked whether the decision, because it proposed the 
67 Id. at 14.
68 Zdeněk Kühn, Ultra Vires Review and the Demise of  Constitutional Pluralism: The Czecho-Slovak Pensions 
Saga, and the Dangers of  State Courts’ Defiance of  EU Law, 23 Maastricht J. Eur. & coMp. L. 185, 194 (2016).
69 Alkotmánybíróság [AB] [Constitutional Court] Dec. 5, 2016, MK.22/2016, translation at https://
hunconcourt.hu/uploads/sites/3/2017/11/en_22_2016.pdf  (Hung.).
70 See Gábor Halmai, Abuse of  Constitutional Identity. The Hungarian Constitutional Court on Interpretation of  
Article E) (2) of  the Fundamental Law, 43 rEv. cEnt. & E. Eur. L. 23, 28–30 (2018).
71 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of  22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area 
of  international protection for the benefit of  Italy and Greece, 2015 O.J. (L 248) 80.
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transfer to Hungary of  over a thousand people collectively and without an examina-
tion of  their individual circumstances, conflicted with Article XIV(1) of  the Hungarian 
Fundamental Law, which prohibits the collective expulsion of  foreigners.72 The HCC 
claimed it would answer this first question in a separate ruling.73 This separate ruling 
has never appeared, and what happened to it is not clear.
The Commissioner’s second question was more abstract. It asked, in a general sense, 
whether Hungary is entitled a) to review norms of  EU law for conformity with the 
national constitutional conception of  fundamental rights or b) to examine whether 
they go beyond the competences of  the European Union; and, if  Hungary can do this, 
which institution of  the state may carry out the review.74
The HCC declared itself  competent to perform such review. In doing so, it made 
reference to a wide range of  national court judgments in this area, though this was 
done unsystematically and without real engagement with the reasoning or constitu-
tional context of  each different legal system.75 The HCC also noted the CJEU’s prac-
tice of  taking account of  the “constitutional demands” of  the member states.76 The 
main judgment is therefore quite innocent and anodyne in appearance. The HCC 
attempts to position itself  firmly in the mainstream of  national apex court practice, 
acknowledging the constitutionally authorized nature of  national membership of  the 
EU; the special and original nature of  the EU as a new legal order; the primacy prin-
ciple; and the place of  fundamental rights in the EU. It also makes exactly the kind of  
arguments about Kompetenz–Kompetenz and the duty of  national courts to police the 
boundaries of  the powers of  the Union that I have presented, in this article, as being so 
compelling and justifiable. In the HCC’s words,
[T]he Constitutional Court . . ., in compelling cases and as a resort of  ultima ratio . . . can ex-
amine whether exercising competences on the basis of  [EU Membership] results in the viola-
tion of  human dignity, the essential content of  any other fundamental right or the sovereignty 
. . . and the constitutional self-identity of  Hungary.77
By “constitutional self-identity,” the HCC declared that:
[It] interprets the concept of  constitutional identity as Hungary’s self-identity and it unfolds 
the content of  this concept from case to case, on the basis of  the whole Fundamental Law and 
certain provisions thereof, in accordance with the National Avowal and the achievements of  
our historical constitution . . . .78
But context is everything. The Fundamental Law was enacted by Fidesz using its two-
thirds parliamentary majority in 2011, though the possibility of  a new constitution 
had formed no part of  the 2010 election debates or campaign.79 As Halmai notes, 
72 Magyarország Alaptörvénye [The Fundamental Law of  Hungary], Alaptörvény, art. XIV(1) (Hung.).
73 Alkotmánybíróság [AB] [Constitutional Court] Dec. 5, 2016, MK.22/2016, ¶ 29.
74 Id. ¶¶ 12–14.
75 Id. ¶¶ 33–44.
76 Id. ¶ 44.
77 Id. ¶ 46 (footnotes omitted).
78 Id. ¶ 64.
79 On the Hungarian Constitution generally, see constitution for a disunitEd nation: on hungary’s 2011 
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the constitution was enacted “without any elementary political, professional, scien-
tific or social debates.”80 There was, prior to the enactment, a “national consultation” 
involving the sending out of  questionnaires to every voter, but the results of  this exer-
cise have never been made public.81
The “National Avowal” to which the HCC refers is the Fundamental Law’s Preamble. 
It is phrased, in many respects, in the kind of  aspirational, solemn, and self-reverential 
language that one finds in such preambles across Europe and around the world, 
though it lays it on rather more thickly than most. It speaks of  Hungary being part of  
“Christian Europe” for a thousand years; of  Hungary having “defended Europe” “over 
the centuries” (an obvious reference to Hungary’s historical place on the front-line 
between the Ottoman Empire and the empires of  Europe); and of  “honour[ing] the 
achievements of  our historical constitution.”82
The HCC’s attempt to dress its judgment in the borrowed robes of  legitimate consti-
tutional adjudication elsewhere in Europe is therefore complicated by the context in 
which it operates. It is a clever attempt, and one which might fool the unwary. But it is in 
the concurring and dissenting judgments that the mask slips. The concurring opinion 
of  Judge Pokol adds that “the provisions, and in particular the National Avowal, of  the 
Fundamental Law of  Hungary—contrary to many other European constitutions—
have raised above all the national independence of  Hungary and the safeguarding 
of  State sovereignty in several declarations and value-statements.”83 Quite what 
this means is not clear, and the dig at “many other European constitutions” is unex-
plained. What are explained very clearly are the ideological underpinnings of  Judge 
Pokol’s opinion, of  the Decision itself, and the politics behind the historical claims of  
the National Avowal:
We cannot expect any future decrease of  the flow of  millions of  migrants targeting Europe, 
and the deep conflicts in the parallel societies of  the big Western cities warn us what we have to 
protect Hungary from. Considering the tensions we see today within the European Union, the 
need to protect Hungary from the proliferation of  tensions from the Western part of  the Union 
can result in the future primary importance of  the [HCC]’s procedure of  sovereignty and con-
stitutional identity control, the foundations of  which have been laid down in this decision.84
It is in this baleful context, of  racist conspiracy theories about “migrants targeting 
Europe” and the “parallel societies” of  “the big Western cities,” that the Decision must 
be read. This is not loyal opposition: it is paranoia.85 A body such as the HCC will take 
its opportunities where it finds them, and its abuse of  the legitimate jurisprudence of  
other national courts discredits only itself. It certainly does not provide grounds for 
the rejection of  a legally justifiable and ethically sound concept such as CP. Being the 
80 Gábor Halmai, National(ist) Constitutional Identity? Hungary’s Road to Abuse Constitutional Pluralism 5 (EUI 
Department of  Law, Research Paper No. 8, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2962969.
81 Id. at 8.
82 On the “historical constitution,” see Halmai supra note 70, at 40–1.
83 Alkotmánybíróság [AB] [Constitutional Court] Dec. 5, 2016, MK.22/2016, ¶ 89.
84 Id. ¶ 93.
85 I use the term non-clinically, following Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, harpEr’s 
Mag. (Nov. 1964), https://harpers.org/archive/1964/11/the-paranoid-style-in-american-politics/.







oab035/6274307 by guest on 13 M
ay 2021
Constitutional pluralism and loyal opposition   17
output of  a captured kangaroo court, and being based on malicious reasoning funda-
mentally at odds with the claimed values of  European integration, Decision 22/2016 
fails both elements of  the legitimacy test.
2.4. A mixed bag: The Weiss saga
We have now seen two examples each of  loyal opposition and disloyal opposition in 
the European constitutional context. The final case to be examined, the PSPP judg-
ment of  the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court, GFCC), 
is somewhat more difficult to classify.
In March 2015, the European Central Bank (ECB) launched the Public Sector Asset 
Purchase Programme (PSPP),86 whereby it would purchase public bonds of  Eurozone 
member states in an attempt to get inflation rates—then very low—back to the ECB’s 
target of  being below, but close to, 2%. In 2017, the program was subject to a consti-
tutional challenge in Germany, the applicants arguing that the PSPP contravenes the 
EU Treaties’ prohibition of  lending to or otherwise financing the member states;87 the 
principle of  conferral;88 and the principle of  democracy under the Grundgesetz (Basic 
Law, GG), an element of  which is that the Bundestag must “take all essential decisions 
on revenues and expenditure.”89
The GFCC referred the case to the CJEU, which held that the PSPP is within the 
competences of  the Union. This was unsurprising, given the CJEU’s generally expan-
sive approach to the delineation of  Union competences, and the particularly generous 
approach it has taken in the context of  the Eurozone crisis, as demonstrated by the 
cases of  Pringle90 and Gauweiler,91 to which the CJEU in Weiss makes constant refer-
ence. As regards the prohibition of  monetary financing, the Court followed Gauweiler 
in declaring that the safeguards built into the PSPP were enough to ensure that the 
PSPP would not reduce the impetus for Eurozone States to conduct a “sound” budg-
etary policy.92
The core of  the CJEU’s judgment, for present purposes, concerns the principle of  
conferral. Here, the Treaty distinction between monetary policy (an exclusive EU com-
petence93) and economic policy (the province of  the member states) was crucial. For 
the Court, one must look principally at the objectives of  a measure in order to deter-
mine whether it falls within the area of  monetary policy.94 The Court acknowledged as 
undisputed the potential for the PSPP to have an impact on member state finances and 
86 Decision (EU) 2015/774 of  the European Central Bank of  4 March 2015 on a secondary markets public 
sector asset purchase programme, ECB/2015/10, 2015 O.J. (L 121) 20, as amended.
87 TEU, supra note 11, art. 123(1).
88 Id. art. 5(1), read in conjunction with TFEU, supra note 24, arts. 119, 127–33.
89 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], May 5, 2015, 2 BvR 859/15, 2 
BvR 980/16, 2 BvR 2006/15, 2 BvR 1651/15, ¶ 104, translation at https://bit.ly/3qMoBcj [hereinafter 
PSPP].
90 Case C-370/12, Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756.
91 Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400.
92 Case C-493/17, Weiss, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1000, ¶¶ 101–44.
93 TEU, supra note 11, art. 3(1)(C).
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on the real economy that could be brought about by economic policy measures, but 
noted that this does not necessarily stop the PSPP being a monetary measure, as long 
as these effects are indirect.95 Given that the PSPP’s objective—to raise interest rates 
to the ECB’s target—can be “attached”96 to the EU Treaty objective of  price stability;97 
and that its means—the buying of  marketable instruments—is specifically provided 
for in the Statute of  the European System of  Central Banks (ESCB) and the ECB,98 the 
Court found the PSPP to fall within the sphere of  monetary policy, and thus within the 
conferred powers of  the Union.
The Court had no difficulty in declaring the Union action proportionate. The PSPP 
was a suitable means of  achieving the ECB’s goals given the general monetary and 
financial climate, and the similar activities of  other central banks.99 As regards ne-
cessity, the CJEU held that, given the risk of  deflation and the virtual impossibility of  
further cuts to interest rates, the PSPP’s stringent eligibility requirements, its lim-
ited volume and duration, and other factors, the program did not manifestly go be-
yond what was necessary to achieve the objective sought.100 What emerges from the 
CJEU’s reasoning is the formal, procedural nature of  the proportionality review it is 
conducting, its willingness to take the ECB at its word, and the relatively low level of  
scrutiny that results. While this may theoretically be justifiable in light of  the ECB’s 
independence and the broad discretion it is granted by the Treaties, it was not to be 
enough for the GFCC.
Upon the case’s return to Karlsruhe, the GFCC agreed that the proportionality of  
the ECB’s program was of  central importance, but was distinctly unimpressed with 
the CJEU’s analysis, describing it as being “not comprehensible and thus objectively 
arbitrary.”101 Crucial was the distinction between a procedural and a substantive 
approach to proportionality review of  the acts of  the Union’s institutions. For the 
GFCC, what is important is not the ECB’s objective in coming up with the PSPP, nor 
the instruments that were employed, but rather the PSPP’s actual effects, monetary 
and economic. Such effects include, for the GFCC, the risks that “necessary consol-
idation and reform measures” in certain member states will not be implemented;102 
that member states will be dissuaded from pursuing “sound budgetary policy”;103 and 
that some unspecified “impact” will fall on “shareholders, tenants, real estate owners, 
savers, or insurance policy holders.”104 The CJEU’s alleged “complete disregard”105 for 
such risks results in a “structurally significant shift in the order of  competences to the 
95 Id. ¶¶ 59–70.
96 Id. ¶ 57.
97 TFEU, supra note 24, arts. 127(1), 282(2).
98 Case C-493/17, Weiss, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1000, ¶ 69.
99 Id. ¶¶ 74–8.
100 Id. ¶¶ 79–92.
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detriment of  the Member States,”106 rendering not just the PSPP but the CJEU’s judg-
ment itself  ultra vires.
Under the first leg of  the legitimacy test I have sketched in this article, the GFCC 
passes institutional muster. The German Rechtsstaat has not been subject to attack in 
the manner of  Poland or Hungary, and whatever disagreements one may have with 
its decisions, the GFCC is an independent body worthy of  respect. However, it is in 
the second element of  the test that PSPP fails to convince. Though based on sound 
theoretical fundamentals regarding the logical impossibility of  a Union of  limited 
competences being the sole determinator of  the limits of  those competences, certain 
aspects of  the GFCC’s approach are regrettable, and serve as a stark illustration of  
the importance of  communication, self-restraint, and self-awareness in the context 
of  European constitutional conflict. It beggars belief  that the GFCC was surprised by 
the CJEU’s reasoning, which hewed so closely to that of  Pringle and of  Gauweiler. If  the 
German Court was so intent on the CJEU conducting a probing, substantive propor-
tionality assessment of  the ECB’s actions (as is emphatically not its wont), it should 
have made such a desire clear in its Order for reference, which it did not. Moreover, if  
unsatisfied with the CJEU’s response to its questions, it could have acted as the ICC did in 
the Taricco saga, and referred further questions in light of  the CJEU’s findings. Though 
it was noted above that the ICC did not relent even after the return of  its second set of  
questions, its conduct throughout the Taricco litigation was beyond reproach (at least 
up until its decision that the Taricco rule could never be applied, a finding on which 
views will differ). The GFCC, by contrast, comes out of  the PSPP dialogue looking like 
a court spoiling for a fight, rather than one seeking to engage in good-faith efforts at 
the coordination of  overlapping national and supranational constitutional systems.
But the problems with PSPP go deeper: the judgment also suffers from a lack of  
vertical and horizontal coherence. Vertically, the GFCC’s approach to proportionality 
review—specifically the third step, proportionality stricto sensu—differs from the way 
in which the principle is applied and assessed by the CJEU, at least in the context of  
Article 5(4) TEU.107 The GFCC’s failure to take into account that proportionality is a 
principle with different concrete expressions across the Union shows a regrettable lack 
of  self-awareness and indeed of  humility, and is arguably contrary to the GFCC’s own 
stated practice, invoked in PSPP itself, whereby ultra vires review of  EU norms is to 
be coordinated with the CJEU and conducted “cooperatively in accordance with the 
European integration idea and relaxed through mutual consideration,”108 and where 
the CJEU “has a right to tolerance of  error.”109
Horizontally, the GFCC in PSPP seems to be operating in a curiously bipolar consti-
tutional universe, consisting of  the German constitutional order, the EU constitutional 
order, and no others. PSPP is not a decision of  a court that has taken into account its 
106 Id. ¶ 157.
107 See Annegret Engel, Julian Nowag, & Xavier Groussot, Is This Completely M.A.D.? Three Views on the Ruling 
of  the German FCC on 5th May 2020, 3 nordic J. Eur. L. 128, 134 (2020).
108 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], July 6, 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06, 126 








oab035/6274307 by guest on 13 M
ay 2021
place in a polyarchic constitutional system. A crucial part of  the analysis here is atten-
tion not merely to legal text but to political subtext. It does not breach the principle of  
the equality of  the member states to recognize the political and economic reality that 
a dispute about the statute of  limitations in Italy, severance payments in Denmark, or 
pensions in Czechia is of  a rather different order of  magnitude than the question of  
continued German participation in quantitative easing programs on which the eco-
nomic fortunes of  a continent depend. This being the case, citizens right across the 
European Union are entitled to feel a certain indignation at the cavalier behavior of  
the most powerful court in the most powerful member state. Relatedly, it is a mistake to 
read the GFCC’s decision in Weiss in a vacuum, incognizant of  the political orientation 
of  the applicants in the case.110 As in Gauweiler, the applicants in PSPP were a range 
of  right-wing figures seeking, by means of  judicial review, to place legal limits on the 
independence and autonomy of  the ECB because they simply happened to disagree 
with the manner in which the ECB has exercised this independence in its “whatever 
it takes” approach to quantitative easing. Underlying all this is the deeply tiresome 
conception, unmoored from reality, of  the euro as some kind of  German charity pro-
ject. The verdict in PSPP is replete with references to the risk of  the PSPP reducing the 
incentive for “certain” member states111 to pursue “sound” budgetary policies,112 as if  
budgetary “soundness” were an objective legal standard, and not an entirely contin-
gent notion that shifts according to the given economic landscape and the particular 
conception of  political economy one employs in the analysis.
But we cannot necessarily blame the GFCC for its repetition of  the concept of  budg-
etary “soundness,” given that such language is to be found in the EU Treaties them-
selves,113 and it is here that we come to the heart of  the issue: PSPP is simply the 
necessary result of  the unsustainable and unworkable distinction at the core of  the 
political and legal constitution of  the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The EU 
Treaties’ allocation of  monetary policy to the EU and economic policy to the member 
states has had disastrous consequences, including leaving the European Union unable 
to respond to the Eurozone crisis without taking actions, such as the PSPP, which are 
at the very least of  questionable legality under the scheme of  the EU Treaties as they 
currently stand. Moreover, this division has no basis in economic, monetary, or con-
stitutional theory, but is rather the result of  the compromise whereby the European 
Union was to have a shared currency but not a shared budget and shared liabilities.
In the aftermath of  PSPP, there have been calls for national ultra vires review to 
be abandoned,114 or for the EU Treaties to be reformed with a view to establishing an 
institutional mechanism for the resolution of  Kompetenz–Kompetenz questions by a 
110 Antoine de Cabanes & Clément Fontan, Why Germany’s Far Right Wants Judges to Rule Europe’s Monetary 
Policy, Jacobin (May 24, 2020), https://jacobinmag.com/2020/05/germany-europe-judges-afd-banks/.
111 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], May 5, 2015, 2 BvR 859/15, ¶ 137.
112 Id. ¶ 171.
113 See, e.g., TFEU, supra note 24, art. 119(3).
114 Piet Eeckhout, Federico Fabbrini, Laurent Pech, & Renáta Uitz, National Courts Cannot 
Override CJEU Judgments, vErfassungsbLog (May 26, 2020), https://verfassungsblog.de/
national-courts-cannot-override-cjeu-judgments/.
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special formation of  the CJEU, to include national court judges.115 For reasons which 
will become clear in the next section, such proposals, though well-intentioned, are 
misguided. This does not mean that the Treaties are not in need of  reform: only that 
the reform must focus on the root cause of  the problem (the unworkable nature of  the 
economic/monetary distinction) and not its mere symptom (disagreement between EU 
and national courts on where to draw the line). There is much to criticize in PSPP, but 
it is ultimately an instance of  constitutional conflict caused by the structural tensions 
at the very heart of  the EMU, and not a threat to the claimed values of  the Union it-
self  or to the rule of  law. It therefore serves as a useful interstitial marker, a midway 
point on the second leg of  the legitimacy test, that illustrates both the dangers and the 
advantages of  the incorporation of  loyal opposition into EU legal practice, and—in its 
political effects—the importance of  constitutional conflict as an animating tension.
3. Constitutional pluralism, constitutional identity, and 
loyal opposition in EU legal scholarship
We have now seen examples of  legitimate and illegitimate opposition to the CJEU’s 
conception of  the primacy of  EU law, and one case that lies somewhere in-between. 
Some scholars have concluded that, however well-intentioned the scholarship on CP 
may have been, the development of  the new European post-fascism, and its adop-
tion of  constitutional pluralist language in order to justify deviations from European 
norms, means the theory is now so dangerous that it must be abandoned. As Daniel 
Kelemen and Laurent Pech put it, “[c]onstitutional pluralism is a theory designed for 
polite society, but we live in brutal times.”116 On this analysis, constitutional pluralists 
must recognize that “their creation is having destructive consequences that threaten 
the entire EU legal order.”117 There is little room for disagreement here: you are either 
with the EU or you are against it.
However, this new critique is by turns misbegotten, inattentive, and unwise: first, in 
its grounding on a fundamentally mistaken reading of  the nature of  the primacy of  
EU law; second, in its failure to distinguish between legitimate and abusive constitu-
tional identity claims; and, third, in the underlying political, legal, and constitutional 
assumptions that lead to its willingness to place so many eggs in the single basket of  a 
hierarchical conception of  EU law.
3.1. The primacy of  EU law
Kelemen is explicit that his critique of  CP is based on a worldview where Union law has 
“supremacy” over national law.118 However, the concepts of  “supremacy” and “pri-
macy” are conceptually distinct, and it is to “primacy” that the CJEU refers in its own 
115 Daniel Sarmiento & Joseph H.H. Weiler, The EU Judiciary After Weiss, vErfassungsbLog (June 2, 2020), 
https://verfassungsblog.de/the-eu-judiciary-after-weiss/.
116 Kelemen & Pech, supra note 6, at 74.
117 Id. at 59.
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jurisprudence. “Supremacy” implies and requires an erga omnes hierarchy between 
norms or institutions within a single, integrated system or order. “Primacy” is con-
cerned with the in casu preference given to one norm or institution over another in the 
context of  interacting but distinct systems or orders.119
In seeking to bolster this monist view of  the relationship between EU law and na-
tional law, Kelemen refers to the member states’ affirmation of  the CJEU’s primacy 
jurisprudence in Declaration 17 annexed to the TFEU, whereby they: “recall[] that, in 
accordance with well settled case law of  the [CJEU], the Treaties and the law adopted 
by the Union . . . have primacy over the law of  Member States, under the conditions 
laid down by the said case law.” But Kelemen makes no mention of  the normative 
status of  this Declaration, nor of  its legislative history. As a Declaration annexed to the 
Treaties, and not as part of  the Treaties themselves, it is not legally binding. Though 
it expresses the agreed political position of  the member state governments at the time 
of  its declaration (and is thus worthy of  respect), it cannot override the specific means 
by which EU law is constitutionally incorporated in each member state. Moreover, 
this non-binding status arises precisely because the explicit and legally binding “pri-
macy clause” of  the failed Constitutional Treaty (CT)120 was removed in the process 
of  turning that Treaty into the Lisbon Treaty. Article I-6 of  the CT would have stated 
that “[t]he Constitution and law adopted by the institutions of  the Union in exercising 
competences conferred on it shall have primacy over the law of  the Member States.” 
We cannot simply pretend that this statement entered into law. It did not.121
In cases of  conflict, Kelemen writes that national apex courts can “remedy the sit-
uation by compelling their government either to amend their constitution, to seek to 
change the EU legal norm involved by working through the EU political process, or, if  
necessary, to withdraw from the Union altogether.”122 However, these three options do 
not describe practical or theoretical reality, and though Kelemen does acknowledge 
that withdrawal would be a “drastic” step, he does not balance the (always) extreme 
difficulties and heavy consequences of  such a move against the (variable) weight of  the 
particular legal issues that may be at stake in a case of  constitutional conflict between 
a member state and the EU. It is correct that withdrawal is the ultimate safety valve 
when it comes to constitutional conflict in Europe, and marks the EU as being signif-
icantly different from other (quasi-)federal systems. However, exit from the European 
Union is a momentous step, with enormous consequences for the withdrawing state 
(and for the continuing European Union), and, more importantly, with potentially life-
changing implications for the citizens of  the withdrawing state and the remaining 
states, particularly those who have exercised their freedom of  movement under the 
119 See Bobić, supra note 25, at 1405–9. See further Matej Avbelj, Supremacy or Primacy of  EU Law—(Why) 
Does It Matter?, 17 Eur. L.J. 744 (2011).
120 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1.
121 Besides, even the CT’s primacy clause arguably leaves open the question of  Kompetenz–Kompetenz, given 
that EU law is given primacy only in areas of  Union competence. Just as is now the case, it is not clear as a 
matter of  (all) national law that the CJEU either is or ought to be entitled to be the sole and final adjudicator 
of  whether the European Union has acted infra vires.
122 Kelemen, supra note 1, at 140.
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EU Treaties. The “speedy-exit” approach of  the critics is far too quick to show member 
states the door in the event of  disagreement. Is it not rather glib to answer the always-
present possibility of  constitutional conflict between the member states and the EU by 
saying “well, you can just leave”?123
Consider the Taricco context: should Italy now withdraw from the European Union 
because of  the (still unresolved) incompatibility with EU law? After all, neither Italian 
law nor the Italian constitution have been amended. The CJEU did not reverse its juris-
prudence. This then leaves us with exit. But though the principle of  legality in criminal 
matters is important, the precise length of  the statute of  limitations in cases of  VAT 
fraud would be a rather recherché ground on which to base the undoing of  sixty years 
of  European integration and the legal unmooring of  the lives of  millions of  people. On 
the other hand, the (vital) importance of  Italy’s European obligations, and the (un-
questioned, but not unquestioning) loyalty it owes to the CJEU, are not sufficient to 
prejudice the rights of  criminal defendants. Put simply, in the Taricco saga, the ICC was 
right and the CJEU was wrong—a state of  affairs demonstrated by the cogency of  the 
ICC’s reasoning and the poverty of  the CJEU’s reasoning; and one that is not captured 
by or reflected in Kelemen’s three possibilities, or in the general “supremacist” view of  
the relationship between EU law and national law.
Similarly, there were at least four ways in which the Ajos conflict could have been 
resolved. First, the legislature could have amended the law in order to bring Denmark 
into line with its Union obligations. This is in fact what has since happened: the 
Folketing has removed the discriminatory exceptions, and all is now well.124 Second, 
the Commission could have brought an enforcement action against Denmark. Third—
and in the context of  the Mangold case law this is rather more unlikely than it perhaps 
should be—the CJEU might have reconsidered its jurisprudence, as it did (or tried to) 
in Taricco II. Finally, matters may simply have rested as they were, as they did after the 
CCC’s judgment in Holubec. This may be unsatisfactory, but such a modus vivendi is in 
fact entirely in keeping with the frequently messy—but nevertheless basically work-
able—way in which federal systems operate: changes in the composition of  the CCC 
led to improved relations with the CSAC, and a quiet narrowing of  the application of  
Holubec to bring the law into line with Landtová.125 We must not let the legalistic fetish 
for perfection and smooth institutional interoperation cloud the observable fact of  the 
difficulties of  reconciling the different layers in a composite legal order. Any account 
of  the relationship between EU law and national constitutional law that insists on the 
total subordination of  the latter to the former in the case of  conflict, and does so by 
making dire predictions of  chaos if  the CJEU’s conception of  the principle of  primacy 
is breached, must also account for the fact that constitutional law actually exists and 
operates as a sociological system under non-ideal circumstances of  political churn 
and institutional fallibility, and not as a pure theory. For Kelemen, allowing national 
123 See Flynn, supra note 22, at 222–7.
124 Lov Nr. 52 af  27. januar 2015 [Law No. 52 of  Jan. 27, 2015] (Den.). See now the consolidated Lbk. Nr. 
1002 af  24. august 2017 [Law No. 1002 of  Aug 24, 2017] (Salaried Employees Act) (Den.).
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courts to rule EU acts ultra vires “would destroy the legal order.”126 But this is demon-
strably untrue: though the CCC, the DSC, the ICC, and the GFCC really did refuse to 
follow judgments of  the CJEU—in 2012, 2017, 2018, and 2020 respectively—eppur 
si muove. It is certainly the case that such disagreements between legal orders are un-
fortunate, but the only way to prevent them altogether would be to turn the Union 
into exactly the kind of  vertically integrated legal order—with a specific and explicit 
EU Treaty clause on the supremacy of  EU law—that it is not.
Primacy is an important principle of  EU law, to which all member states have 
assented, subject in each member state to the specific means of  national legitimation 
and incorporation of  EU law. It is grounded in a coherent reading of  the EU Treaties, 
and is justified, inter alia, by the duty of  sincere co-operation, the requirements of  legal 
certainty, and the equality of  the Member States. It is a principle of  long-standing and 
great importance, and is deserving of  respect. However, from the national perspec-
tive, the principle is neither absolute nor unlimited, and it must be reconciled in hard 
cases with the continuing—though modified—sovereignty of  the Member States; the 
legally binding nature of  their constitutions; their generally greater democratic legit-
imation than the Union; and much else besides. Each of  Kelemen’s resolutions (do-
mestic amendment, Union amendment, exit) has its place, but as we have seen, they 
do not exhaust the range of  possibilities in seeking to reconcile EU and national law 
in cases of  conflict.
3.2. Constitutional identity claims
A particular focus of  the critics’ ire is the use of  the notion of  “constitutional iden-
tity” by national courts to justify departure from EU norms. For Federico Fabbrini and 
András Sajó, “constitutional identity” is indeterminate and arbitrary.127 It is “drenched 
with neo-sovereigntist features and is contrary to the rule of  law,”128 and “[a]nyone 
who relies on the language of  identity runs the risk of  making constitutional adjudi-
cation open to nativist populist considerations.”129
A full-blown defense of  constitutional identity is beyond the scope of  this article, 
and, in any event, it is not clear that such a defense is desirable or even possible. The 
concept is indeterminate, and we have already seen its abuse by the captured HCC. If  
Article 4(2) TEU has a role to play in the policing of  boundary disputes by the Union 
and Member State judiciaries, a rigorous conceptual and analytical framework must 
be constructed around it.130
However, this dismissal of  all constitutional identity claims as being somehow de-
structive of  the fabric of  the Union causes scholars to conflate very different cases. 
Referring to Holubec and Ajos, Fabbrini and Sajó write that “[w]hile in these judgments 
126 Kelemen, supra note 1, at 148.
127 Fabbrini & Sajó, supra note 6, at 467–9.
128 Id. at 458.
129 Id. at 472.
130 See, e.g., constitutionaL idEntity in a EuropE of MuLtiLEvEL constitutionaLisM (Christian Calliess & Gerhard van 
der Schyff  eds., 2019).
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national courts did not formally utter the word[s] constitutional identity, they followed 
a similar ratio, by refusing to comply with [CJEU] rulings . . . in the name of  protecting 
specific features of  the national legal order.” But as I  have demonstrated, to group 
the Czech and Danish cases together merely because they both exemplify a heterodox 
approach to the primacy of  EU law is untenable, and shows a remarkable lack of  at-
tention to the specifics of  the cases. Holubec and Ajos are radically different in terms of  
subject matter, constitutional and political context, and most importantly as regards 
the quality and justifiability of  the reasoning employed.
The rejection of  constitutional identity claims then feeds into the rejection of  the 
entire notion of  CP. For Kelemen and Pech, “some ideas are inherently dangerous, and 
constitutional pluralism is certainly one of  them. . . . [C]onstitutional pluralism is an 
abnormally dangerous product and its manufacturers should be held to a standard 
of  strict liability for the damage it has caused.”131 Fabbrini and Sajó quote this ap-
provingly, but in doing so they simply replace “constitutional pluralism” with “con-
stitutional [identity],” as if  the two ideas were identical.132 Elsewhere, Kelemen and 
Pech speak of  constitutional identity and constitutional pluralism as being “closely 
related”133 and “twin concepts.”134 However, the two ideas are analytically separate, 
and must be disaggregated. Constitutional pluralism is the general descriptor for the 
whole stable of  theories that seek to privilege neither the national over the European 
nor the European over the national. Constitutional identity is only one of  the specific 
means by which the contingent and non-universalizable question of  the superiority 
of  one over the other in a given case might be determined. We could banish constitu-
tional identity from our jurisprudence altogether, as the critics suggest, and it would 
not make a dent in the lived reality and normative desirability of  a pluralist conception 
of  the European legal space.
The approach of  the critics is therefore one that seems to imagine that the EU 
Treaties contain something they do not (an explicit, legally binding statement of  the 
“supremacy” of  Union law), and do not contain something they do (an explicit, legally 
binding guarantee of  respect for national constitutional identity). As with so much 
else in law and in life, identity and pluralism are susceptible to misuse and abuse—as 
Kelemen and Pech themselves admit before proceeding with their criticisms.135 The 
trick is to learn to distinguish between legitimate and abusive invocations of  constitu-
tional identity and CP, and not to regard every instance of  opposition as encouraging 
disloyalty to the claimed values of  the European project.
131 Kelemen & Pech, supra note 6, at 61. See also Tommaso Pavone & R. Daniel Kelemen, The Evolving Judicial 
Politics of  European Integration: The European Court of  Justice and National Courts Revisited, 25 Eur. L.J. 
352 (2019).
132 Fabbrini & Sajó, supra note 6, at 472.
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3.3. Background assumptions of  the critique
At the root of  all these criticisms is a belief  in the Union as a bulwark against author-
itarianism. This claim may not be explicit, but it is always a background feature. This 
idea is not unfounded: it is no accident that the collapse or overthrow of  dictatorships 
in Portugal, Spain, Greece, and the former Eastern Bloc was swiftly followed by EU 
membership, in part as a way of  trying to prevent antidemocratic backsliding.
I share with all the critics their rejection of  the new authoritarianism in Europe, but 
this belief  in the European Union as a defense against the worst instincts of  Europeans 
is beginning to look rather forlorn. The European Union’s difficulties in ensuring the 
democratic credentials of  the member states are well known, not least to Kelemen, 
whose excellent work on the issue is required reading.136 Though the EU may be a 
Union of  ostensibly democratic states, its leadership has shown very little appetite for 
confrontating national backsliding. Is it really the case that the Union can restrain our 
worst impulses at national level? If  it can, will it? And if  it will, is this inherently the 
case, and guaranteed always to be so? And what happens if  and when the boot is on 
the other foot? Kelemen has noted, as Robert Schütze did before him,137 the parallels 
between modern European CP and the dispiriting history of  “states’ rights” in the 
United States. There, the tools of  nullification and interposition were used by racists in 
attempts to prevent the Federal imposition of  equal rights for African Americans. Just 
as federal legal hierarchical superiority was the only corrective to white viciousness in 
the United States, the argument goes, European Union hierarchical superiority is the 
only corrective to the growth of  post-fascism in Europe.
But the recent US controversy regarding the Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) agency of  the Department Homeland Security is also instructive: here we see an 
authoritarian federal power using an oppressive agency to enforce unjust policy, against 
the wishes of  certain states. Suddenly, US liberals generally, and liberal legal scholars 
in particular, have discovered a new appreciation for states’ rights.138 Certainly the 
cases are not identical: for one, states of  the United States have no right of  unilateral 
withdrawal from the Union, as exists in the European Union. But whether in the United 
States or in the European Union, arguments for or against absolute federal supremacy 
are frequently contingent: we simply side with the constitutional order or layer with 
which we happen to agree, for ethical or political reasons. But with authoritarians sit-
ting on the Council of  the European Union, nominating Commissioners and judges of  
the Court of  Justice, and ultimately controlling the votes of  large numbers of  Members 
of  the European Parliament (MEPs), are we wise to place such faith in EU law as a be-
nevolent influence? It is not beyond the bounds of  possibility that, at some point soon, 
136 See R. Daniel Kelemen, Europe’s Other Democratic Deficit: National Authoritarianism in Europe’s Democratic 
Union, 52 gov’t & opposition 211 (2017); R.  Daniel Kelemen, The European Union’s Authoritarian 
Equilibrium, 27 J. Eur. pub. poL’y 481 (2020).
137 Robert Schütze, Federalism as Constitutional Pluralism: Letter from America, in constitutionaL pLuraLisM in 
thE EuropEan union and bEyond 185 (Matej Avbelj & Jan Komárek eds., 2012).
138 See generally Lorraine Marie A. Simonis, Sanctuary Cities: A Study in Modern Nullification? 8 brit. J. aM. 
LEgaL stud. 37 (2019).
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authoritarians will achieve electoral success in more and more member states, and 
“good” member states may seek to resist “bad” Union law. Joseph Weiler once observed 
that “a democracy of  vile people will be vile.”139 It follows that a Union of  vile member 
states will also be vile. One hopes that if  it were the Union delegitimizing opposition 
and fomenting bigotry in, say, Poland or Hungary, the critics would be turning to their 
MacCormick in order to see how the member states might legitimately oppose EU law.
The rise of  post-fascism in Europe is a political problem. It is entirely possible, 
but only possible, that law, including Union law, and institutions, including EU 
institutions, may help in combatting this disease. But to place too much faith in these 
is to let the liberal love of  legalism and faith in institutions cloud hard-headed analysis 
of  the threats we face. The CJEU certainly has a role to play: there has already been 
at least some movement on this front, with the Court—as we have seen—authorizing 
national judiciaries to conduct their own analysis of  the independence of  the Polish 
judiciary140 and finding the Orbán government’s treatment of  the Central European 
University contrary to the EU Treaties and the Charter.141 However, the CJEU itself  is 
not necessarily immune from capture, or—at least—infiltration. Certainly, it is the EU 
institution most shielded from partisan interference, and the system of  appointments 
to the CJEU has become more robust since the entry into force of  the Lisbon Treaty. 
Any attempt by an Orbán or a Kaczyński to nominate the kind of  opportunist hire-
ling with which they have stuffed their national courts would be resisted. But the 
CJEU cannot be our only—or even main—hope for navigating the new dispensation 
in Europe.
It happens to be the case for now that we look to the Union to keep democratic 
backsliding in the member states in check. But we must remember that in a different 
context, absolute Union supremacy may look less attractive. The fact that, as things 
currently stand, this is unlikely is immaterial: it is possible, and that is enough. Just as 
not all assertions of  constitutional identity are wicked, not all assertions of  federal su-
premacy are good. We must become more sophisticated in our analysis, and learn to 
distinguish between the legitimate and the abusive, the loyal and the disloyal.
4. Conclusion
There is a certain professional deformation that occurs to scholars of  EU law. We feel 
at home with the subtleties and complexities of  a notoriously opaque legal order. We 
tend to agree with the basic principles of  European integration, though we may dis-
agree strongly about its specifics. We are socialized into a cosmopolitan habitus of  
shared ideas, shared presumptions, and very frequently shared phenotype and social 
class. It is therefore no wonder that anything that smacks of  Euroscepticism, in the 
overbroad and ideologically incoherent sense we have come to understand it, raises 
the hackles. But in identifying too strongly with our subject, we impoverish our own 
139 Joseph H. H. Weiler, Europe: The Case Against Statehood, 4 Eur. L.J. 43, 60 (1998).
140 Case C-216/18 PPU, LM, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586.
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perspective. Thus blinkered, it seems natural that, of  course, the CJEU is correct about 
primacy, and has been correct since 1964. Of  course EU law is good, cosmopolitan, 
socially and politically pluralist, just, protective of  rights, progressive, democratic etc. 
Of  course any legal approach that seeks to defend or entrench the legitimate goods of  
national constitutionalism is dismissively and fearfully rejected as “nationalism” or 
“sovereigntism,” by which we mean bad, narrow-minded, parochial, unjust, exclu-
sionary, racist, oppressive, undemocratic, etc. We are therefore inclined to agree with 
Kelemen that “EU law, and the [CJEU] as the ultimate guardian of  that law, must enjoy 
unconditional supremacy.”142
But aren’t we also supposed to be constitutionalists? Constitutionalism teaches us 
that the unconditional supremacy of  anything, emphatically including law, is inher-
ently dangerous.
I argued in the introduction that there is no loyal opposition in Union politics, 
though there should be. In section two, I asked whether it might be possible for there 
to be loyal opposition in EU law, whereby loyal state-level deviations on complex 
questions of  the application of  EU law within the member states might be domes-
ticated and integrated into the system itself, rather than catastrophized. In section 
three, I then extended the proposal to EU legal scholarship. The point is not just that 
constitutional pluralism is both descriptively accurate (which is relatively uncontro-
versial) and normatively desirable (which is most definitely not): it is that daring to 
make these arguments should not lead to excommunication. It may well be that I am 
entirely mistaken. It may be that total acquiescence to the CJEU’s view of  primacy 
is what will prevent further decay in European constitutional democracy. The ortho-
doxy may be correct. But whether or not this proves true, heterodoxy must not only be 
tolerated in EU constitutionalism: it must be actively engaged with and incorporated 
into the system, as a form of  loyal opposition.
142 Kelemen, supra note 6, at 403.
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